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I.  The Changing Global Context 
Significant changes in the global setting over the course of the last few decades resulted in an 
increasing prominence for the pursuit of transnational justice and individual accountability. The aftermath 
of the terrifying attacks on America on September  
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1. Good Governance 
It has become a cliché to argue that genuine economic development can be envisaged only 
when it is accompanied by good governance (Kaufmann et al, 1999). Francis Fukuyama has 
argued that only in high trust societies can capitalism of higher order prevail (Fukuyama, 
1995). Capitalism in low-trust societies can be vigorous at times but it cannot sustain itself 
for long at a level where good governance is observed. Trust is crucial in the sense that only 
with high level trust prevailing in business communications and transactions, in investment 
decision and implementation can one envisage achieving minimum communication and 
transaction costs and maximum profits. Robert Putnam (1993) has argued that in making 
democracy work, social capital is essential in facilitating and enabling joint discussion 
about, planning and implementation of public policy and institution building. Only when 
such social capital is embedded in civil society and mobilizes for democracy can one 
envisage democracy functioning well in society. 
 
Good governance is defined as consisting of rule of law, openness, and accountability by 
Richard Rose and Doh Chull Shin (2001). By rule of law is meant impersonal rule and 
denial of arbitrariness. By openness is meant that the avenue is universally accessible to 
citizens to know about what is being done, will be done, and has been done about the 
conduct of governance. By accountability is meant that the conduct of government needs 
explanation whenever such explanation is demanded by citizens. Until the recent past the   3
list of requirements for what was then called advanced democracies consists of rule of law, 
civil liberties and political rights. Freedom House follows this more or less old-fashioned 
but more precise usage of freedom (2001). The argument for good governance is that good 
things go together and when good things are somehow assembled to make democracy work, 
good results are bound to come (Norris et al, 2002; Kaufmann et al, 1999). However simple 
it might sound at a first glance, these requirements often are heavy ones for many new -- 
and often old --democracies. The point is very important, especially when the steady 
deepening of globalization has been widening the disparities between the rich and the poor, 
between the privileged and the disadvantaged. 
 
Globalization as symbolized by instant transmissions, communications, and transactions the 
world over has been transforming the ways in which economic development has to proceed 
and in which democratic political development has to proceed. Globalization stresses the 
primordial importance of technological innovation as a key to competitive survival in a 
good contrast to the three classical key components of capitalist development from the mid-
19th century through the whole 20th century, i.e., capital, labor and resources (Inoguchi, 
2002). Globalization stresses the primordial importance of openness, impersonal rules and 
accountability as a key to good global governance (Rose, 2001; Rose/Shin, 2001) in a good 
contrast to the three classical key components of democracy, i.e., rules of law, civil 
liberties, political rights (Hall, 19  ; Freedom House, 2000) 
 
Globalization means forces that work across borders and have an increasingly defining 
character of human interactions (Held et al, 1999; Iqbal/You, 2001). Its impacts on 
economic equality have been relatively well examined. Globalization seems to aggravate 
economic inequality often in short term. The gaps in income level have increased. Whereas 
until the recent past nationally segregated and thus in a sense protected environments   4
enabled many workers to be employed by firms which may not expect them to be highly 
skilled from top to bottom. But for the last decade or so, the galloping pace with which 
globalizing technologies are adopted and used in running business activities has 
dramatically been changing the employment and earning patterns of many workers. Some 
skilled and adept to new technologies and new systems get richer and richer, others who are 
not get poorer and poorer (UNDP, 2001, World Bank, 2001). Thus it is clear that 
globalization integrates nationally segmented markets more deeply into a global market. 
But it sharpens distinction between the competitive and the non-completive and between the 
thriving and the marginalized. Hence anti-globalization zealots intermittently crowd the 
gatherings of such richmen club organizations as the World Trade Organization, the World 
Bank, the Group of Eight, the International Monetary Fund. Hence the extremely 
marginalized, despaired and deprived intermittently resort to terrorism. It is not a 
coincidence to hear many policy prescriptions to prioritize extinguishing extreme poverty on 
the earth in order to achieve human development, development on the basis of facilitating 
and enhancing development of each and every individual on the globe, as contrasted to the 
nationally segmented and largely focused on collective material well-being (Sen, 2000; 
UNDP, 2000). 
 
The impacts of globalization on democratic politics have not been given a sufficient 
empirical examination of it (Iqbal/You, 2001; Rose/Shin, 2001; Norris, 2001). Is the use of 
new globalizing technologies condusive to democratization and democratic consolidation? 
Is it condusive to the empowerment of those disadvantaged and poor? It seems that the 
deepening of globalization has been coincided with the accelerating birth of a new democratic 
regime on a massive scale in the last quarter of the twentieth century from some 35 up to 
120 democratic regimes out of 189 United Nations member states (Freedom House, 2001; 
Vanhanen, 1997; Huntington, 1993). The basic logic underlying the prospective   5
democratizing effect of such new technologies is that the openness, impersonal rules and 
accountability associated with these technologies especially as used by the governments 
and citizens alike are bound to lead to encouraging good governance in the sense that the 
government gets more self-disciplined about its behavior and the citizens use feedback 
mechanisms toward the government (Rose, 2001). Therefore, goes the logic, corruption gets 
curtailed, human rights violation alleviated with such technologies in use. Their impacts 
would be compared to the application of universal suffrage in elections. At the same time, it 
also seems that globalization has been intermittently giving birth to bankrupt economies 
and failed states in tandem with, and in the wake of, such high-pace democratization waves. 
 
 
I focus here on the relationship between the media and the internet and political beliefs and 
actions in democracies and quasi-democracies, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China, the 
Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore. The data examined here are derived 
largely from the project on globalization and political cultures of democracy in Western 
Europe and East and Southeast Asia, led by myself and funded by the Japanese Ministry of 
Education, Cultures, Sports, Science and Technology for the period from 1999 till 2003 
(project number 11102000). In 18 societies in both rims of the Eurasian Continent, the 
survey was conducted by the Gallup Association led by its Japanese member, the Nippon 
Research Center, in October 2000 with the random sample of 1,000 in each society. 
 
I will proceed as follows. I will first argue that in discussing democracy in relation to good 
governance, one needs to be sensitive to the differences emanating from their historical 
origins of democracy. (1) classical type of democracy, (2) late-comer state-led democracy, 
and (3) third-wave democracy and to identify where the weakness of each type is located in 
relation to those requirements of good governance.   6
 
Then I will relate these three types of democracy to the development of the media from 
newspapers to radio and television through cable televisions and the internet and locate the 
weakness of each type of the media in relation to those requirements of good governance, 
especially in view of the ability of the media to create the space for the voice by the poor 
and the disadvantaged and to enhance the accountability of the government to the poor and 
the disadvantaged. 
 
Thirdly, I will summarize the empirical proxies of voice and accountability in East and 
Southeast Asia, using the Freedom House indicator of freedom for voice, and the 
Cyberspace Policy Research Group’s indicator of government website figures for 
accountability and Transparency International's indicator of corruption for transparency. 
 
Fourthly, I will examine empirically whether use of new media technologies help move 
closer to good governance by using the survey data on new media technologies in relation to 
political beliefs and actions in East and Southeast Asia. Focusing on how people think of 
their government's role and performance, I will examine whether the use of new 
technologies is related to a certain set of political beliefs held by respondents. In other 
words, this section will reveal the respondents's beliefs about what roles their government 
should play and how their government has performed in this or that policy area might be 
related to their use or non-use of new media technologies. Then, focusing on the range of 
political actions, I will examine whether the use of new technologies might be related to the 
ease with which a certain type of political action is envisaged and chosen to advance their 
cause. In other words, these new technologies might be responsible for the popular 
propensity or inclination to resort to certain political actions or non-actions that are 
politically highly significant in terms of organizing and mobilizing those population   7
affected by those informationally globalizing forces. 
 
Lastly, on the basis of preceding empirical examinations, the conclusion will be drawn as to 
the relationship of new technologies and the advancement of voice and accountability. My 
conclusion is that all the virtuous-circle kind of argument about good governance can claim 
its overall validity but that without situating the historical contexts of new media 
technological and democratic development in each society under examination such claim 
cannot operationalize its policy program adequately. 
 
 
2. Three Types of Democracy: Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
At least three types of democratic development may be discerned (Potter 2000; Inoguchi, 
1996): First, the classical development of democracy amongst a small number of 
privileged elites in the initial yet fairly long stage; second, the 20th century development 
of democracy under state-led economic development and war mobilization; third, the fin-
de-siecle development of third-wave democratization in the 4th quarter of the 20th century. 
Their features and their relationship with the press and mass media will be examined. 
 
First, classical democracy can be found in the somewhat idealized American development 
of democracy. It is said that this type of democracy is characterized by societal liberalism 
and political democracy (Lipset, 1998; Rose/Shin, 2001; Freedom House 2001). It is Alexis 
de Tocqueville who wrote that press censorship and universal suffrage are hard to coexist 
for a long period of time (Tocqueville, 1945, vol.1, p.190; Kasza, 1988, p21). Here press 
censorship means societal liberalism while universal suffrage means political democracy. It 
is not coincidental that Alexis de Tocqueville was observing American democracy where   8
liberalism was practiced fairly widely as far as free population were concerned. Liberalism 
practiced among privileged strata became more widely practiced step by step, first by the 
abolition of slave institutions in the mid-19th century, second by the universal suffrage by 
early twentieth century as far as men are concerned, third by the citizen rights granted to 
minorities in the mid-1960's, fourth by the fairly pervasive striving for gender equality in 
the fourth quarter of the twentieth century. By societal liberalism I mean the generally high 
level civic liberty enjoyed among the population who tend to exhibit law-abiding and 
others-trusting nature. By political democracy I mean the generally high level political 
rights granted to everyone above a certain age and exercised as a normal routine. 
 
Second, mass democracy of latecomers can be found, say, in the Japanese development of 
democracy (Yamamoto, 1981; Kasza, 1988). It is symbolized by the coincidence of press 
censorship and universal suffrage, an anti-Tocqueville phenomenon. This took place in the 
form of the simultaneous legislation of the internal security preservation law and the 
universal suffrage law in 1925 in Japan. Characteristic of this type of the relationship 
between mass media and democracy is that while democratization steadily made progress, 
control of mass media in terms of not allowing mass media expressive "subversive" and 
"disturbing" ideas to the government was enhanced. Restrictions on freedom of press and 
expression went hand in hand with consolidation of democracy in terms of mass inclusion 
into the political system (Banno, 1996). Japan since 1945 departed from this type 
considerably because of the defeat and the occupation reforms of its political and economic 
arrangements. But what has remained alive with respect to mass media is the relatively 
firm grip of power by the Post and Telecommunications Ministry over mass media in terms 
of authorization of mass media firms. With the spirit of upholding public interests 
prescribed in the Telecommunications law, mass media tend to exercise self-restraint and 
moderate themselves with respect to "subversive and disturbing ideas" This pattern of   9
democracy is alive and well in such polities as South Korea and Malaysia, where 
democratization has deepened itself significantly in terms of participation and contestation 
in a democratic framework but where societal liberalism has been somewhat feebler largely 
because of the retention of the internal security act from non-democratic or colonial days 
(Zakaria, 1995). 
 
Third, third-wave democracies of the fourth quarter of the 20th century (Huntington, 1993; 
Rose/Shin, 2001) can be found in the penetration of transnational media and the partially 
hollowed participation in local politics. Satellite television and electronic communications 
such as internet and email have effectively undermined the old style of state-led mass 
media penetration of the second type (Barber, 1993). In the Philippines the English 
speaking privileged elites watch transnational CNN news whereas the Tagalog -speaking 
masses watch news in local Tagalog news. President Joseph Estrada was criticized by the 
former group of people for his not-so-good command of English. His response was that 
what is wrong with that, citing Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi who was not known 
for his English. The linguistic unity of the nation has been undermined as far as the first 
official language for the last one-century is concerned. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt 
appeared on CNN, saying that he cannot spend a day without watching CNN news reports. 
And he is not alone among Third World leaders about CNN news reports although most do 
not say so publicly. Democratic participation is skewed in the per capita income level. In 
China direct elections of village and other types of local leaders have been held in many 
places (He, 2001). Judging from a number of studies, it looks as if places at a medium-
income level such as Liaoning, Shandung, and Fujian exhibit the higher participation level 
whereas places at a low-income level such as Guizhou and Shanxi and places at a high-
income level such as Zhejiang and Guandong manifest the much lower participation level. 
People stricken by poverty cannot afford organizing such an activity even though poverty   10
may need some political action whereas affluent people do not need to resort to rely on 
public policy very much. Only places at a medium-income level want to make use of 
democratic instruments to effectuate policy change. 
 
In the United States, those moderate electorates occupying the Downsian centre (Downs, 
1957) of the political continuum of right (tax reduction and strong defense) and left (social 
policy and engagement policy) tend to be alienated by excessively negative advertisements 
on television. They tend to become an apathetic and indifferent abstainer by staying away 
from voting participation. It is true that party politics in the United States encourages 
candidates to move toward the Downsian centre since the centre is most densely populated. 
But in addition to less educated strata who do not participate in democratic politics very 
much, those highly professional and high-income strata at the Downsian centre have shown 
much weaker inclinations to participate in politics, further contributing to the United 
States registering the lowest participation rate among the electorates in the United States, 
the European Union and Japan ('Ansolabehere/ Iyengar, 2000). Although neither China nor 
the United States is a third-wave democracy, their partially hollowed participation seems to 




3. Old and New Terminology of Mass Media: Enabling and Facilitating 
 
Freedom of press has been widely regarded as a benchmark of any democratic form of 
government. Without freedom of press, the government finds it difficult to know popular 
preferences. Without freedom of press people finds it hard to keep its criticism of the 
government heard and its demands to the government pressed. Freedom of press is thus an   11
essential element of and foundation for democracy. It symbolizes both political right and 
civil liberty. 
  
At a time when the notion of freedom of press was articulated in West European writings in 
the 18th and 19th centuries, the level of technology was still relatively low in order to see 
mass media flourish on national and international scales (DeFleur/Ball-Rokeach, 1989). It 
was only in the late nineteenth century that newspapers came to be circulated in a 
relatively large number. Also it was only in the early twentieth century that radio appeared 
as a mass medium of communication. About a half a century later in mid 20th century 
television started to become a most effective mass medium. Yet again half a century later 
computer technology has realized yet another mode of mass communication, internet and e-
mail. 
  
It is most important to notice that the difference in the characteristics of technology of 
mass media has affected the nature of democracy in a profound way. (Katz, 1998; Zaller, 
1992). When first-generation newspapers were circulated in the late nineteenth century, 
they were considered as targeted at a relatively small number of elites. Printing and 
distribution technology was limited to enable massive nation-wide circulation. Democratic 
politics at a level beyond privileged elites was only beginning to be envisaged. Newspapers 
were considered both as a watcher of government conducts and as an articulator of views 
of elites whether they were in the government or in the opposition camp. They were 
oftentimes instruments of elites in the game of politician's politics. The government used 
them for enlightenment and support mobilization. The government exercised its influence 
sometimes through subsidies to and bribery of the press. The opposition used them for 
criticism and sometimes blackmailing the government to make a deal (Sasaki, 1999). 
Newspapers did certainly strengthened national self-consciousness and national identity   12
especially when its circulation was coincided with the period of nation building (Yamamoto, 
1981; Inoguchi, 2000b). Yet newspapers contributed to encouraging a growing number of 
parliamentary elites thinking much more highly of themselves vis-à-vis the king, prime 
minister or president (Katz, 1998). In that sense newspapers contributed to both 
nationalism and democracy. 
  
Radio was invented and used to communicate news on a nation -wide scale in the first 
quarter of the twentieth century, and it was regarded as the birth of mass media along with 
the development of massively circulated newspapers. Its target was an amorphous mass of 
people then becoming eligible to democratic elections. In many countries, governments for 
nation building, war mobilization, and other goals most effectively used radio. It was 
largely through  Radio Republik Indonesia, for instance, that the newly independent 
Republic of Indonesia realized the population of 1700 languages to speak Bahasa 
Indonesia, a somewhat artificially constructed national language for the purpose of 
attaining and maintaining national unity and solidarity in the 1950s and 1960s (Anderson, 
1972;Kitley､2000). Other than nation-building purposes, radio did enable national leaders 
directly outreach men on the street and thereby bypass parliaments in exercising power 
(Katz, 1998). Sukarno of pre-and post-independence Indonesia most effectively used the 
newly found power of radio, and so did Franklin D. Roosevelt. So did a number of 
dictatorial leaders in the very countries Allied Powers faced antagonistically in the 
Second World War. Oftentimes national leaders who effectively used radio were able to 
obtain parliamentary support as well as popular support. 
 
It was this formidable installation of mass media in society that led pundits to seek 
countervailing institutions and practices in coping with the onslaught of mass media on 
what were then regarded as an amorphous and atomized set of people in forming their   13
views and sentiments. 
 
One positive view set forth by Paul Lazarsfeld et al (1944) was that opinion leaders should 
be identified to let them to play the role of digesting mass media contents and helping the 
mass to formulate their opinions in a certain direction. Here opinion leaders were folksy 
pundits at grass roots level. Mass communication channels are to be mediated by pundits in 
the community so that mini communication can be installed in a positive constructive 
fashion. This is the standard answer to the question of mass media's potentially atomizing 
and dehumanizing effects on what should be interpersonal communication with human face. 
 
In reacting to the "bowling alone" phenomenon of diminishing communitarianism in the 
1980s and 1990s, Robert Putnam (2000) tries to resuscitate the spirit of community in 
American society. In a good Tocquevillian fashion, Robert Putnam prescribes the revival of 
trusting each other, associating with each other, and forming social institutions may be the 
first step of preventing society from collapsing into a completely individualized space with 
no trust, no association and no social institution tying them together. He does not 
necessarily ascribe the 'bowling alone' phenomenon to the effects of mass media. However, 
his prescription resembles very much to Paul Lazarsfeld in the sense that his critical 
variable is social capital, something that binds people positively whenever social action 
and public policy are to be needed (Putnam, 1993, 2001; Fukuyama, 1996; Woolcock, 
forthcoming; Serageldin and Grootaert 2000). 
 
Naturally there are negative views of mass media effects. One representative is Elizabeth 
Noelle-Neumann(1984). Her view is that once the distribution of opinion is known publicly 
through opinion polls or otherwise, then what she calls the spiral of silence takes place. In 
other words, the majority of opinion leads the minority to silence itself. Mass media report   14
opinion polls, editorials, letters to the editor, articles and comments, through which people 
know the profile of preferences and views on certain issues. This, she argues, stifles the 
lively discussion among populace precisely because they soon realize that they are either 
majority or minority. In other words, the tyranny of the majority prevails in a mass 
communication society in a much more pronounced fashion. 
 
Television is another medium. It has had another set of impacts on democracy. Politicians 
can now talk directly to people through television. Not only national leaders on the capital 
city but also all candidates for parliamentary elections can outreach the populace, not only 
in their districts but also nation-wide. In the United States as well as in other countries, 
the freedom of expression and the freedom of speech are regarded as more important than 
the need tightly to regulate money for electoral campaigns on a level playing field. The US 
Presidential Elections in 2000 was waged with the highest ever money spent for campaigns, 
but the argument for freedom of expression seems to have surpassed the argument against it. 
In Japan, for instance, a different thinking prevails as to which is just in the use of mass 
media in electoral campaigns. The television exposure per candidate is equal in terms of 
minutes and free of costs as television time is provided free by a quasi-governmental TV 
station;  the number of candidate's posters is equal; the number of words that can be used 
to express a policy platform for each candidate, which is printed free of charge on major 
nationally circulated newspapers, is equal. But this type of regulation tends to favor 
incumbents and give more hurdles to new comers who normally need to be exposed longer 
than incumbents for being voted for. 
 
Irrespective of television favoring those candidates full of money or those incumbents, 
television seems to have the effect of diluting the power of political party organizations 
(Katz, 1998). It focuses much more on personalities and styles of politicians than anything   15
else. Rather than intricate arguments full of details, the beauty of simplicity and clarity 
tends to prevail. In Japan as well as in other countries, TV debate programmes abound, 
giving opportunities to give the sense of virtual participation to TV audiences, as such 
programmers are participated both by well-known and/or high-ranking national leaders and 
parliamentarians and by popular figures of high name recognition outside the government. 
In US presidential elections two major candidates have debates in front of television. In 
Japan almost every week, such live discussion programmes expose parliamentarians of all 
walks of beliefs to the public so that major politicians are exposed to public scrutiny 
intermittently and perhaps excessively. By exposing the weaknesses of politicians through 
mishaps and unintended facial expressions that do not hide their internal thoughts and 
sentiments, it seems that political distrust deepens. (cf, Nye et al, 1997). 
  
In the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, another instrument of mass media was born. 
That is an internet and an email through a computer, a television or a mobile telephone. 
This media allows users to conduct both mass communication and mini communication. 
Through email one can reach a large number of people of similar sociological attributes all 
at once and alternatively one can construct a seemingly intimate in-depth communication 
channel with another body. Through interest one can broaden the realm of information 
almost infinitely. This represents a revolutionary change in the conduct of human 
communication. This might as well be called mass-mini communication because after all it 
enables both mass communication and mini communication. At least those skillful users of 
internet feel that they have access to what is equivalent to Library of Congress catalogues 
and Central Intelligence Agency files in their respective field of knowledge. At least those 
skilful users of email can feel that they conduct both a grand orchestra and a mini-
symphony. Computer technology allows one to use targeting in human communication. In 
sum, targeting makes electronic communication an intriguing devise the overall effects  of   16
which have not yet been fully examined. 
  
One area where targeting's effects have been empirically examined is negative TV 
advertisements. TV ads enable targeting to be fully utilized with effects on electoral 
participation and voting. Stephen  Ansolabehere and Shanto Iyengar (1995) did it. Through 
quite imaginative use of experimental methods and data analysis as applied to negative ads, 
they have come up with a striking conclusion. That is that relentless attack of adversaries 
in negative ads alienates a large number of open-minded and highly educated independent 
voters. They are repulsed by the entire system and easy to become apathetic and indifferent 
non-voters. By attacking a relatively small number of holders of an extreme view, negative 
ads create a large space of non-partisan educated open-minded electorates to vacate their 
original participatory location into that of apathy and abstention by their extremity and 
absurdity while not affecting the target electorates themselves very much. 
  
Another area where targeting's effects are clearly seen is the fragmenting effects of 
satellite televisions like CNN. In the Philippines, for instance, those watchers of TV news 
in English through CNN tend to be privileged English-proficient elites while those 
watchers of TV news in Tagalog through more local stations tend to be less privileged, less 
English-proficient masses. One century after English was made the official national 
language, the Philippines seems to be fragmenting the linguistic unity of the nation 
through satellite televisions. When satellite televisions like CNN bring about what 
Americans think it right and fit for emission, the question naturally arises as to whether 
contents are really something local societies need (Katz/Weddell, 1977). First, authentic 
local culture might be sacrificed in favor of American globalist culture emissioned through 
satellite televisions. This is especially true with entertainment programmes. Second, the 
American global interests are likely to prevail over more locally nuanced national interests   17
of various countries. If those local elites watch more American satellite televisions news 
programmes than local television news programmes, one of its consequences may be the 
increasing gap between Americanized elites persuaded by the American flavored globalist 
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4. New Media Technologies 
 
Tot al Japan Sout h  Kor ea Chi na Tai wa n Si ngapore M al aysi a I ndonesi aT h a i l and P hi l i ppi nes
Tot al 9, 160 1, 129 1, 010 1, 002 1, 002 1, 006 1, 000 1, 011 1, 000 1, 000
100. 0 100. 0 100. 01 0 0 . 01 0 0 . 01 0 0 . 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
A ppl i es 2, 342 372 517 269 277 433 236 26 148 64
25. 6 32. 9 51. 22 6 . 82 7 . 64 3 . 02 3 . 62 . 6 14. 86 . 4
6814 753 493 733 725 573 764 985 852 936
74. 4 66. 7 48. 87 3 . 27 2 . 45 7 . 07 6 . 49 7 . 4 85. 2 93. 6
N / A44--------
0. 00 . 4--------
Tot al Japan Sout h  Kor ea Chi na Tai wa n Si ngapore M al aysi a I ndonesi aT h a i l and P hi l i ppi nes
Tot al 9, 160 1, 129 1, 010 1, 002 1, 002 1, 006 1, 000 1, 011 1, 000 1, 000
100. 0 100. 0 100. 01 0 0 . 01 0 0 . 01 0 0 . 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
A ppl i es 4, 109 361 446 379 379 691 638 230 578 407
44. 93 2 4 4 . 23 7 . 83 7 . 8 68. 7 63. 8 22. 75 7 . 84 0 . 7
5, 048 765 564 623 623 315 362 781 422 593
55. 16 7 . 85 5 . 86 2 . 26 2 . 2 31. 3 36. 2 77. 34 2 . 25 9 . 3
N / A33--------
0. 00 . 3--------
I use email to communicate with other countries
Tot al Japan Sout h  Kor ea Chi na Tai wa n Si ngapore M al aysi a I ndonesi aT h a i l and P hi l i ppi nes
Tot al 9, 160 1, 129 1, 010 1, 002 1, 002 1, 006 1, 000 1, 011 1, 000 1, 000
100. 0 100. 0 100. 01 0 0 . 01 0 0 . 01 0 0 . 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
A ppl i es 965 69 98 81 71 325 162 20 67 72
10. 56 . 19 . 78 . 17 . 13 2 . 31 6 . 22 . 06 . 77 . 2
8, 193 1, 058 912 921 931 681 838 991 933 928
89. 4 93. 7 90. 39 1 . 99 2 . 96 7 . 78 3 . 89 8 . 0 93. 3 92. 0
N / A22--------
0. 00 . 2--------
I receive an international satellite or cable TV
Tot al Japan Sout h  Kor ea Chi na Tai wa n Si ngapore M al aysi a I ndonesi aT h a i l and P hi l i ppi nes
Tot al 9, 160 1, 129 1, 010 1, 002 1, 002 1, 006 1, 000 1, 011 1, 000 1, 000
100. 0 100. 0 100. 01 0 0 . 01 0 0 . 01 0 0 . 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0 100. 0
A ppl i es 3, 072 218 484 736 917 254 155 70 103 135
33. 5 19. 3 47. 97 3 . 59 1 . 52 5 . 21 5 . 56 . 9 10. 3 13. 5
6, 085 908 526 266 85 752 845 941 879 865
66. 4 80. 4 52. 12 6 . 58 . 57 4 . 88 4 . 59 3 . 1 89. 7 86. 5
N / A33--------
0. 00 . 3--------












Drawing from the survey data on globalization and political cultures of democracy done in 
18 societies in East and Southeast Asia and Western Europe in October 2000, I focus on four 
such media technologies: the internet, email, foreign news programs and cable televisions. 
 
(a) the Internet 
Users of the Internet are more easily located at societies with higher per capita income 
levels. South Korea, Singapore, Japan and Taiwan are such examples. China is an exception 
to this observation with an Internet user’s percentage roughly on a par with that of Taiwan. 
This is largely due to the fact that the Chinese sample, unlike most other samples, consists of a few 
large cities. Japan is sort of an outlier of this observation in that it has far less Internet-users 
per total population for the society which enjoys the regionally and globally highest per 
capita income level. Indonesia and the Philippines do not have many Internet-users   19
apparently in proportion to their per capita income levels. 
 
(b) email 
Users of email gives a different pattern from users of the Internet. Email users seem to be 
determined more strongly by the ease with which English is spoken. Singapore and 
Malaysia are a former British colony, British Malaya. The Philippines does not evince a 
high percentage of email users. It is a former American colony and its population is 
officially English speaking. But its low per capita income level and the income gap between 
the elite and the masses seem to push down the otherwise a slightly higher level. 
Indonesians use email least per population, which seems to be in proportion to its per capita 
income level. 
 
(c) foreign news programs 
There are less variations on this matter. On the whole, however, Southeast Asians watch 
foreign news programs more often than Northeast Asians. They are more sensitive to 
foreign news as they are much smaller countries. An outlier is Indonesia. Its low level of 
per capita income and its large country status may be preventing them from watching 
foreign news programs more often. Northeast Asians watch foreign news programs less 
often: many of them are not English-speaking; they have many local language TV channels. 
 
(d) cable TV 
Taiwan and China receive a cable TV at a highest level in East and Southeast Asia despite 
substantially different income levels between the two. Next comes South Korea. Then come 
Singapore and Japan, two countries where per capita income levels are high but the 
government regulatory policy seems to make difference. After then come Malaysia, the 
Philippines and Thailand.   20
 
The above examination of the survey data for the nine countries in East and Southeast Asia 
seem to suggest that the overall basic conclusion is that the kind of openness, impersonal 
rules and accountability associated with the use of new technologies related to good 
governance is likely to prevail in East and Southeast Asia as well. But the outliers to this 
basic conclusion must be taken seriously. There are five: 
 
(1) Singapore and Malaysia 
(2) China 
(3) Japan 
(4) the Philippines 
(5) North Korea 
 
(1) Singapore and Malaysia 
These countries, especially Singapore, are quasi-democratic states of more authoritarian 
bent in East and Southeast Asia. Their governments seem to be successful in projecting the 
image of a strong monitoring and censoring state and thus the survey data do not seem to 
carry the same degree of authenticity when the question comes to how respondents think 
about the government. It is not a coincidence that both societies are highly equipped with 
new technologies and have a very large number of English speaking population. Even if 
corruption is effectively curtailed in Singapore, that does  not translate itself into the prima 
facie evidence of good governance. 
 
(2) China 
It comes of a small surprise to find that China has risen to a society highly equipped with 
new technologies under authoritarian rule. Internet population has grown very fast. Cable   21
TV has been received by a huge number of population. Even if the authoritarian government 
monitors email and the internet, this trend seems to prevail. It is not that one individual 
uses a few email addresses including care-of-X addresses to skirt government monitoring 
and intervention. It is not that the government bans a certain Internets from being used. But 
the basic trend is amply there. Naturally the question arises immediately: Where does this 
trend lead to in China? Is democratic regime change likely to take place in China within the 
next 5 to 15 years? Already per capital income level on the coastal China has achieved a 
very high level on which many other countries achieved democratic transition. And all the 
new technologies conducive to good governance have been most vigorously utilized in 
China even compared  to most other East and Southeast  Asian countries. After all if Mao 
Zedong established a class-based revolutionary state, and if Deng Xiaoping achieved 
triggering economic development, Jiang Zeming declared that China is becoming an all-
people state, meaning that a proto-democratic state is in the offing. 
 
(3) Japan 
Japan is an enigma in the sense that the highest per capita income level and the highest 
level of civil liberties and political rights enjoyed in society do not seem to endow it with a 
more impeccable practice of good governance. New technologies in this regard have been a 
few years still behind a few regional countries in East and Southeast Asia. 
 
(4) the Philippines 
Between 1986 and 2000, that is, between the fall of Ferdinand Marcos and the fall of Joseph 
Estrada, one remarkable development has been taking place. Literacy of the population has 
risen to a remarkable level and Tagalog has been used much more vigorously among the 
masses in tandem with overall economic development and political democratization. The 
catch is that the income gap between the elite and the masses seems to be in parallel to the   22
differentiated use of language when they watch TV news programs. The elite like CNN (in 
English) and the masses like local channels (in Tagalog or some other local languages). 
This differentiated choice has been evinced by the fall of Estrada, especially by the 
orientation of the elite and the masses about the desirability or undesirability of the 
resignation of Joseph Estrada. The elite watched CNN and wanted to oust him with action 
mostly taken in mass media and the parliament. The masses watched local TV channel news 
programs in Tagalog and many of them wanted to retain him as President. Since the elite did 
not take mass marches and demonstrations in 2000 as we saw in 1986, the regime change in 
2000 is often characterized as “ people power phase two without people." This 
differentiation seems to affect the nature of democratic politics in the post-Estrada 
Philippines. 
 
(5) North Korea 
It is an extremely closed country. The population is isolated from the rest of the world. The 
possession of radio, for instance, is strictly forbidden. Once spotted to possess one, the 
possessor is bound to get punished severely. Media technologies, old and new, are simply 
not available to the people. Nevertheless, the accounts of North Korean society 
occasionally come out through foreigners and ethnic Koreans from China and Japan. Most 
recently, the exodus from North Korea has been more pronounced. But neither voice not 
accountability exists. 
 
5. Penetration of Democratic Politics 
The extent to which democratic politics is practiced in East and Southeast Asia varies 
immensely. Two contrasting data are given by the Freedom House and by the Gallup 
Association. Freedom in the World is an annual publication of the Freedom House, which 
gives an annual rating of civil liberties and political rights on a number of quite detailed   23
items of these two matters as practiced in all the independent states and dependencies. 
Rating itself is done by its expert team. Since country ratings are amply annotated by expert 
accounts of civil liberties and political rights in each country, Freedom in the World has 
been used for quite a wide range of purposes despite such criticism as American, 
individualistic bias. The Gallup Association led by the Nippon Research Center conducted 
the Millennium Survey in 152 countries in January 2000. The Freedom House data are 
concerned about how experts think civil liberties and political rights in each country. The 
Millennium Survey data  are concerned about how respondents in each country responded  
to the questions about the democratic performance of their government in a number of 
policy areas such as corruption, human rights, and the economy. The catch here is  that the 
more authoritarian the government is perceived by respondents, the more praise comes from 
respondents. This seems to be clearly the case with Singapore and Malaysia. 
 
I compare the results of these two data about the practice of democratic politics in East and 
Southeast Asia. The eight countries I examine are: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore. Most striking is that the Freedom 
House data and the Millennium Survey data are negatively correlated. Freedom House's 
rating among the eight countries is as follows in the descending order: 
 
Japan     13 
Taiwan   28 
South  Korea    28 
the Philippines    33 
Thailand    33 
Hong  Kong    46 
Malaysia    53     24
Singapore    53 
China      59 
 
Millennium Survey ranking among the eight countries is as follows in the descending order. 
Malaysia    1 
Singapore    1 
Hong  Kong    4 
Philippines    10 
Taiwan   15 
Thailand    22 
K o r e a      3 6  
Japan     53   
China      no  response 
 
 
Two  more  narrowly  focuses  indicators  of  good  governance,  those  of 
accountability  of  transparency;  one  useful  in  locating  each  source  on  a 
certain continuum, especially in relation to the Freedom House ranking of 
freedom. The relatively small numbers of the www of government departments 
in Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore are a small surprise. Also I note 
that  the  authoritarian  governments  of  Singapore  and  Hong  Kong  are  highly 
ranked on the transparency scale.   25























Source: A count of government departments listed by name in the Cyberspace Policy Research Group web site 
report of web operations in all ministry-level organizations worldwide. See www.cyprg.arizona.edu, downloaded 
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5.New Media and Political Beliefs 
In this section I will use new survey data on the relationship between new 
media  technologies  and  certain  political  beliefs  that  are  entertained  by 
such users. I am interested in users of four new technologies, the internet, 
email,  foreign  news  programs  and  cable  television,  as  identified  by  the 
Asia-Europe  Survey  covering  18societies  in  East  and  Southeast  Asia  and 
Western  Europe  conducted  in  October  2000,  led  by  Takashi  Inoguchi,  and 
funded by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and 
Technology, for the period between 1999-2003 (project identification number 
11102000).  My  interest  is  how  the  introduction  of  new  media  technologies 
might influence their political beliefs in certain directions. Since it is 
a  one-shot  survey,  it  is  not  possible,  strictly  speaking,  to  causally   27
interpret  the  cross-tabulated  data.  But  one  can  indicate  some  plausible 
influences  new  media  technologies  might  exercise  on  users’s  beliefs  and 





Looking  at  the  response  patterns  in  eight  Asian  societies  to  the 
authoritarianism question, it seems clear in most societies that internet 
users are more likely not to subscribe to political authoritarianism (i.e., 
the  government  is  strong  and  people  do  not  have  a  say  in  what  the 
government  does)  and  that  they  are  more  likely  to  subscribe  to  the  view 
that what the government does not make much difference. The latter belief 
is the strongest in Korea. Also pronounced is the egalitarian belief among 
internet users. Again Korea is most pronounced in this respect. Singapore’s 
internet  users  evince  this  same  characteristic,  albeit  to  a  far  lesser 
extent. All these make sense in that the internet brings new ideas often 
from abroad including democracy and equality. But compared to email users, 
this tendency is less pronounced. 
 
5.2 email 
The  belief  that  the  government  does  not  necessarily  make  a  difference  is 
popular among email users. Especially pronounced in this regard is those in 
Singapore  and  Malaysia.  The  view  that  the  government  does  not  care  the 
people  is  no  less  strong  among  email  users  especially  in  Singapore  and 
Malaysia. The belief in egalitarianism is similarly very strong among email   28
users,  again  in  Singapore  and  Malaysia.  In  a  good  contrast  to  those 
responses in Singapore and Malaysia, China and the Philippines manifest a 
diametrically  different  pattern.  In  China  email  users  seem  to  hold  and 
elitist  view.  Email  users  in  China  are  more  privileged  and  elitist,  it 
seems. A similar tendency is found in the Philippines, albeit to a lesser 
extent. 
 
5.3 foreign news programs 
Watchers  of  foreign  news  programs  in  Indonesia  and  Thailand  tend  to  hold 
the  belief  that  the  government  may  not  be  terribly  strong  whereas  those 
watchers  in  Singapore  and  Malaysia  regard  the  government  to  be  strong. 
Those watchers who follow what the government says are the most salient in 
China, Korea and Thailand and the least salient in Singapore and Malaysia. 
The phenomenon in Singapore and Malaysia in this regard seems to indicate 
that  exposure  to  foreign  news  programs  tend  to  lead  them  to  be  somewhat 
critical of the government. Unlike in Singapore and Malaysia where English 
is  widely  used  and  where  emission  of  foreign  news  programs  is  somewhat 
regulated,  the  Philippines  and  Thailand  give  a  good  contrast.  The 
Philippine elites watch foreign cable television primarily in English and 
the masses watch local television primarily in Tagalog. Hence foreign news 
program  watchers-cum-elites  tend  to  subscribe  to  the  belief  that  the 
government is strong, that they follow the government because they lead the 
government, and that egalitarianism is contested by them. 
 
5.4 cable television 
Those who receive cable television tend to believe that the government is   29
not  powerful  in  the  Philippines  –  and  Indonesia.  Many  of  them  are  the 
privileged elites. In Thailand and the Philippines those cable television 
receivers tend to give trust in the government and those who do not receive 
cable television tend to distrust the government. Those who do not receive 
cable  television  in  Indonesia  and  Thailand  do  not  subscribe  to  the  view 
that one should follow what the government says. In China and to a lesser 
extent in Taiwan those cable television watchers tend to exhibit the most 
pro-government  view.  In  Korea  their  response  is  totally  divided.  The 
egalitarian belief is strongly shared by cable television watchers in China 
and Taiwan. In other words, the privileged elites in China and Taiwan seem 
to be the enlightened elites who are more influenced by egalitarianism. In 
a  good  contrast  to  China  and  Taiwan,  it  is  those  cable  television  non-
receivers in Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines that hold their strong 
egalitarian belief. 
 
To sum up, new media technologies should bring about enlightening effects 
on the poor and the privileged. But in a number of societies they seem to 
give further enlightenment and power to those privileged elites. 
 
6. New Media and Political Actions 
I  will  examine  the  relationship  between  new  media  technologies  and 
political  actions  of  those  holders.  Again  the  four  technologies  examined 
are  the  internet,  email,  foreign  news  programs  and  cable  television.  The 
kinds  of  political  action  examined  are  informal  get-togethers,  contacting 
politicians  (on  individual,  local  or  national  issues),  petition,  protest 
and joining a political party.   30
 
First, it is very important to emphasize that the level of political action 
is high if a society is free and democratic. Japan, one of the oldest non-
western democracy, stands out in this regard. Next to come are Korea and 
Taiwan.  In  other  words,  once  societal  liberalism  and  political  democracy 
blossom  more  or  less  fully,  new  media  technologies  seem  to  enhance  voice 
and accountability. 
 
Second,  even  if  a  society  is  not  fully  free  and  democratic,  new  media 
technologies seem to help to facilitate, prod and promote political actions, 
as long as chosen political action is not regarded as politically dangerous 
or subversive. In other words, other features set the basic framework for 
voice and accountability, new media technologies seem to set the parameters 
of voice and accountability more user-friendly. 
 
6.1 Internet 
Internet  users  seem  to  be  more  action-prone  than  non-users.  Especially 
Korea  is  most  action-oriented  whether  it  is  informal  get-togethers, 
contacting  politicians,  petition,  protest  or  joining  a  political  party. 
Internet-users in Singapore are more cautious but they choose informal get-
togethers more frequently than non-users. Although Japanese take political 
action most frequently in Asia, whether they are a user or non-user of new 
media  technologies  does  not  make  too  much  difference.  In  other  words  the 
introduction  of  new  media  technologies  does  not  seem  to  impact  the  voice 
and accountability very much in Japan. 
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6.2 email 
Whether  a  user  or  non-user  of  email  is  does  not  seem  to  make  too  much 
difference.  It  seems  that  emails  are  used  for  bringing  and  socializing 
purposes  in  Asia  but  not  so  much  for  campaigning  purposes  unlike  in  the 
United  States.  But  email  users  in  Malaysia  seem  to  take  one  type  of 
political action with more ease, i.e., joining a political party. 
 
6.3 foreign news programs 
Those watchers of foreign news programs tend to take political action with 
more ease in Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Japan does not make 
too much difference whether they are a watcher or not. The Philippines are 
divided: the elites watch foreign news programs and the masses do not. The 
Philippine watchers of foreign news programs tend to contact politicians in 
a pronounced fashion. 
 
6.4 cable television 
Cable television receivers do exhibit a strong tendency to act politically 
in Taiwan and Korea. Both Korea and Taiwan are not only democratic but also 
good  receivers  of  cable  television.  In  a  good  contrast,  Southeast  Asian 
societies  exhibit  a  less  pronounced  relationship  between  new  media  and 
political action. It seems largely because many of them are less free and 
less democratic. But at the same time, the income gap widens the digital 
divide and the privileged elites use new media technologies far more often 
than the handicapped masses in terms of access to new technologies. 
 
7. Conclusion   32
It has been widely shared wisdom that to achieve development one needs good 
governance. Not just labor, capital, resources and technology, but rule of 
law,  openness  and  accountability  need  to  be  consolidated  in  order  to 
trigger  and  sustain  the  genuine  development  in  the  sense  of  striving  at 
attaining  the  individual  and  collective  betterment  of  human  beings.  The 
twenty-first century is not going to be the era of a crude capitalism, as 
was characterized by Karl Marx in mid-nineteenth century, but should be a 
more  civilized  capitalism,  with  the  blossoming  of  each  and  every 
individual’s potentials realized, with those handicapped and disadvantaged 
in dire need of safety net receiving warm attention and assistance from the 
rest of the world, and with freedom, equality, human rights and democracy 
enjoyed by increasingly large segments of the world population. 
 
It  is  a  never-ending  struggle  of  pulling  out  the  best  out  of  human 
potentials by consolidating the civil and political infrastructure of norms, 
rules  and  values.  In  this  sense,  it  is  not  enough  to  argue  that  genuine 
development  requires  good  governance  as  a  necessary  condition.  What  is 
necessary  for  policy  makers  is  to  have  the  guidance  to  development  and 
governance in ways that suit best the local conditions and contexts they are 
placed in. In order to do so, one needs a set of more historically grounded 
and context-sensitive developmental strategies. I have tried to show, albeit 
on an admittedly very modest fashion, that such a line of analysis of new 
media  technologies  in  terms  of  their  possible  and  real  functions  of 
enlightening political beliefs and encouraging political actions are helpful 
in drafting such a strategy of genuine development and good governance. 
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Democracy is a process of nurturing a certain set of values and instituting 
a  certain  set  of  rules  and  norms  so  that  conflict  of  interests  can  be 
resolved  without  use  of  force  and  coercion.  In  so  doing  new  media 
technology play so important roles. Building the sound relationship of new 
media  technologies  with  democracy  is  a  key  to  good  governance.  From  the 
citizen’s  point  of  view,  they  play  the  role  of  enlightenment,  i.e., 
informing people of important news and events that pertain to the citizen’s 
exercise  of  power  in  influencing  political  outcomes.  More  functionally, 
they  play  the  role  of  a  midwife,  facilitating  the  formation  of  the 
collective preferences of citizens by providing the forum for debates and 
discussions and setting the agenda for collective preference formation; at 
the same time, they play the role of an ombudsman, watching the conduct of 
the government. Conversely from the point of the government, they play the 
role of an agenda-setter, i.e., putting forward the direction of thinking 
and  discussion  on  a  certain  policy  formation.  More  functionally,  they 
exercise  moral  leadership  and  conduct  administrative  guidance  toward 
forming  collective  decision  in  tune  with  that  of  the  government;  at  the 
same time, they play the role of a monitor, mapping out the distribution of 
individual preferences on a certain policy issue. 
 
The roles of press and mass media on the one hand and of the government on 
the other must go hand in hand, checking and balancing potential excesses of these roles 
one another. Never the less, the broad historical legacies of various democracies die hard. 
Classical democracies retain certain legacies of various democracies die hard. Classical 
democracies retain certain legacies of participation gaps among social strata and the 
negatively aggressive advertisement seems to undermine the high participation rate of   34
highly educated and high-income strata, the core of classical democracies. Later-comer 
democracies retain a certain state-led orientation vis-à-vis mass media that may leave the 
role of press and mass media to be only insufficiently fulfilled for the purpose of creating 
good governance. At the same time the relentless wave of satellite television from abroad 
fragments the very neat unity of the nation state according to the model of state-led 
latecomer democracies. For many of third wave-democracies, the growing gaps between 
elites and masses in terms of their different conceptions of good governance especially 
one of its key components, i.e., the relationship of press and mass media with democracy 
seem to give hindrances to the further advancement of good governance.   35
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